Title:	**Sounds of Silence**
Edited By:	Jutta M. Hartmann
	Veronika Hegedus
	Henk van Riemsdijk
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Debaprasad Bandyopadhyay, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India

"Note that ECP will now reduce to descriptive taxonomy, of no theoretical significance. If so, there will be no meaningful questions about conjunctive or disjunctive ECP, ECP as an LF or PF phenomenon (or both), etc. Note that no aspect of ECP can apply at the PF interface, since there we have only a phonetic matrix with no relevant structure indicated. The proposal that ECP breaks down into a PF and an LF property (as in Aoun, et. al., 1987) therefore must take the former either to apply at S-structure or at a new level of "shallow structure" between S-structure and PF." (Chomsky, 1992: fn. 19, pg. 64)

INTRODUCTION

As I have quoted (rather unusually) Chomsky at the beginning of my review, one of the editors of this book, Van Reimsdijk et al (1986) was also cited by the two of the authors, Bendjaballah and Haiden at the beginning of their paper ("A Typology of Emptiness In Templates"). The citation goes like this: "Does the notion 'empty category' constitute a significant grammatical generalization?" (pg.23).

This is a crucial as well as puzzling question as it is still doubtful whether this type of tool would serve the semantactic purpose and could attain explanatory adequacy by clearing up one unresolved question: does empty category erase both category and content or not or there might be a possibility of disjunctive situation? Bendjaballah and Haiden's answer was "a tentative yes" (pg.23) as the "theoretical framework has changed considerably", but in case of post-syntactic component, their answer was negative and this was a paradoxical situation that entailed aporia. Many radical changes had occurred after the question of Reimsdijk et al (note the date: it was 1986) was put into the arena of formal-practitioners of Chomskian syntax.

This review, taking cue from such problematic zones, where, within formalism, decidability of emptiness had elicited ambivalent responses, would try to understand the enterprise that is still subscribing a phenomenon that was already abandoned or being considered as mere "descriptive taxonomy" by the initiator and some of his followers of this particular principle.

SUMMARY

This book on the silenceme (a neologism coined on the basis of phoneme, morpheme, lexeme, sememe, pragmeme etc. Though the authors of this book did not use the term, I am using this term throughout this review for convenience) is published as a part of North Holland Linguistics Series, one of the goals of which, as mentioned in the introductory notes, was to bridge the Platonic as well as Cartesian cognitive tradition with the contemporary generative tradition. Three editors of the book (Hartmann, Hegedus and Riemsdijk) presented an excellent summarized version of eight papers (four on the morpho-phonology and the rests were on syntax) written by nine contributors gathering data from different languages. In describing "Silence in Phonology", they also took help from Ben Hermans in this regard.

The authors of the papers had worked hardly and covered many languages for the purpose of understanding empty elements. Bendjaballah and Haiden's had taken Berber (Afro-Asiatic Group. If we do believe in UG, what is the meaning of such 'genealogical' classification?) nouns to make out emptiness of templates. Cote concentrated on the French holy trinity to show the elements like schwa, liaison and H-aspire. Lowenstamm had dealt with the Yiddish nouns and French gender and proposed the concept of "null-gender" without considering the culture-specific context-sensitive non-discursive game of sex/gender-issue. This paper also sorted out "root" by maintaining philological tradition without being bothered about the epistemological threshold between "modern" linguistics and philology. Scheer, in his exceptional theoretical paper on prosodic hierarchy tidied up prosodic phonology and auto-segmental phonology. According to the author, there must be a sovereign translator's office without any buffer—a no man's land (pg. 168). Boskovic's examples were from English, Chukchee, Selayarsee, Icelandic languages and he largely depended on Chomsky's current position on ECP to elaborate the successive cyclic movement. Kallulli engaged oneself with Hebrew, Albanian and English to elaborate the problems of null objects. Kato concentrated on WH-In-Situ in Japanese by deploying null-operator approach. Suranyi's theoretical paper on Head Movement and cyclic spell out captured some examples from German and Frisian languages.

Apparently speaking, all the authors took "a" model—Chomskian model of syntax and deployed that model to understand the morpho-phono-syntactic silencemes of different languages. However, if one scrutinizes the book, one might find that it is not a single model—rather, as it was revealed from the bibliographies of the respective authors of all the eight papers, they were using simultaneously different models of Chomskian analysis, e.g., Chomsky 1986, 1985 and 2000 books and papers were mentioned in the introduction, but Chomsky, 1981 was elaborated in course of defining the traces (pg.7) and it was not at all mentioned in the introductory bibliography; Chomsky, 2004 was mentioned by Bendjaballa (pg.56), though ECP etc. as explanatory tools were abandoned in that work of Chomsky at that time; Chomsky' name was dropped from the Cote's paper, though the author thought that French language is a "fertile testing ground" for ECP (pg.62) etc. Perhaps the author might think that it was redundant to mention the name of a master figure, who introduced the term within the Extended Standard Theory framework; same thing had happened in case of Lowenstamm's paper on little n; Scheer in his excellent paper on prosodic hierarchy followed only Chomsky et al. 1956 and Chomsky, 1968 and deviated from the Chomskian standpoint when he wrote a small and marvelous chapter on the "Prosodic Phonology: Is a child of Autosegmentation: Boundaries are ugly, Domains are Beautiful" (pp.150-51. It is an excellent proposition leaning towards post-formalist approach); Boskovic followed Chomsky, 1995, 1999, 2000 and 2001 and one forthcoming paper of Chomsky; Kallukulli had started from Chomsky, 1973 and ended in Chomsky, 1986, thus the author followed only the Extended Standard Theory (EST) and obviously enough, there was no traces of minimalist program, where ECP is nothing more than a taxonomic device without any potentiality of explaining the silencemes; Kato's span was much bigger; he begun with Chomsky, 1981 and ended in 2004 and thus amalgamated at least two Chomskian models in his paper on null operator; lastly, Suranyi ' bibliography started with Chomsky, 1986 and ended in 2005, thus the authors incorporated at least two models to attend explanatory adequacy.

Lastly, there are no indexes of authors, languages and key-terms in this edited book.

EVALUATION

Readers may notice that I was detailing and scrutinizing the bibliographic references of the book under review in the previous section, concentrating on one master figure, Chomsky, for a specific reason. After the advent of Principles and Parameter Theory in the early nineties, ECP was gradually losing its ground as an explanatory tool and Chomsky proposed altogether a

different model after the nineties. Therefore, at the beginning of my review I put a minor (as it is an endnote, written in 1992) quote, where Chomsky himself had diluted the issue of ECP.

That, of course, does not entail that other phonologists or syntacticians might abandon this device following a master figure as "silenceme" is a "real" phenomenon to be tackled with, but there should be sufficient reasons to be shown by the authors of a book, published in 2008, for the deployment of such an almost abandoned tool. Moreover, when an author was utilizing different models without being concerned about the epistemological thresholds of all these models, I, as a reader, had faced a grave problem (or many epistemological obstacles that might be the fault of my confusing self, who had encountered so many models developed within the span of fifty years) and I now wish to call this as the problem of incommensurability, where some incompatible models are put together without any competition. How could one put Standard theory of the sixties, Extended Standard Theory of the seventies, GB theory of the eighties, Principles and Parameters approach or Minimalist program of the nineties of the last century and first decade of this century in a same bottle without being bothered about commensurability and vulgar 'epistemological'(?) amalgamation.

This type of practice, which is called as "model-theoretic approach", though in vogue in the domain of contemporary science(s), has sometimes become a case of "mimicry" of a pre-given model. Though large corpus is generated, shaped, appropriated, approximated and codified according to the pre-given formal dice of a model or framework with clerical precision, this type of practice might sometimes lead to intellectual anorexia (the models of the ramp also are suffering from Anorexia Bulimia or nervosa). In case of such epistemologically amalgamated frameworks or hybrid models, as in the case of this book under review, it is very difficult for a reader to escape problems of confusing incommensurability as different models are overshadowing each other. On the other hand, in case of following 1968 brand of generative phonology, the traces of historical linguistics is evident enough (cf. Lowenstamm's paper, where he had dealt with something called "root"—the "original" "authentic"(?) atom!) when anyone was searching substantial underlying forms in the context of morphophonology. Therefore, another epistemological (?) domain was penetrating in the domain of this book: traces of comparative philology! In this context, post-formalists might ask such questions: Who (The speaking/hearing subject) does have the certain knowledge of chronological deterministic orders of arbitrary sounds? Which latter sound is a derivative of earlier sounds? Does it give birth to genealogical fantasy? Does the speaking/hearing subject have the conscious knowledge of fragmented morphophonemic procedural rules de-"sign"-ed by a group of linguists? However, that is an

external critique and that might not be mentioned within the model(s) in which authors of this book were committed.

There is another problem—that is a problem of the present reviewer (a post-fromalist) as Chomsky's algocentric discourse (a discourse that is motivated by meta-mathematical formalism or computational algorithmic simulation guided by the technical rationality, ignoring the non-algorithmic constitutive rules embedded in the human mind) had led to technocratic metaphors that in turn, considered human body as a machine. To me, the techno-centric terms as deployed by Chomsky and followed by Boskovic with a great precision (pp.195-233), are not at all metaphors—a case of displacement of algorithmic/non- algorithmic human mind with an algorithmic machine, but all these are metonyms, by which the potentialities of human mind is condensed and telescoped. Chomsky himself wished to drop the term "computation" as mechanical metaphor) from the vocabulary of syntax after present reviewer's objection (personal correspondence 1994-95. http://files.weedle.com/Media/Image/a1ebfbb6872ee011bdb49862f7a94db3/520x520/88961fa9 172646e590680c94f1ab383c.jpeg), but he has not kept his word. The terms like "Computation', "array" "interface", "parser" etc. or in the operations like "COMMAND", "SATISFY", "SPELL OUT" reflect the metonymic transformation of creative speaking/hearing subject as all these functions in uppercase letter make me remember Schank's language-free representation (PROPEL, MOVE, INGEST or CONTROL, PART etc.) which combines primitive conceptual roles and categories employed to process "natural" (?) language by perceiving body as a machine. One might raise Foucaudian questions here: (**a**) how do we distinguish between natural/normal and unnatural/abnormal language? (**b**) If the goal of such enterprise is to understand the human cognitive domain, is it not a case of anatomo-bio-political intervention into the docile body of the speaking/hearing subjects?

The initial editorial comments and promises that mentioned the incorporation of classic works of Plato, Descartes and cognitive tradition were not at all maintained by the authors of the papers. Of course, one can execute (Chomskian) model-based work without knowing the intricacies of Cartesian cognitive theory as some Chomskian syntactic text-book-writers were explicitly advocating[1]. The problem might be with the basic philosophy of science(s)—we are not at all bothering about such "thing": philosophy of science, when we, as apart from technical intelligentsia, are executing a mechanical reproductive work. The model-followers, i.e., inorganic intellectuals or technical intelligentsia, as a mimic enterprise, are just reproducing their cultural

capital without any social engagement. It is just like an aimless mechanical tool-user, who is making one's own world without any engagement with the other/outer-world.

However, on the other hand, I must congratulate the hard-working editors and authors of this book as they had at least revived the issue of empty elements when ECP was declared dead by some ardent Chomsky-followers. Though, now, syntactic interpretation of empty elements serves nothing to achieve explanatory adequacy, one may take cue from other external sources to add value to so-called valueless (?) empty-elements. To me, there are two-way outs: firstly, one may take recourse to Wittgenstein, Sartre or other continental philosophers (for a brief description of their works and S.N. Ganguly's intervention on this topic cf. Moitra, 1984. Moitra's own taxonomization of silencemes is also important) for justifying the broad title: "Sounds of Silence"; and/or, secondly, for semantactic interpretation of a given corpus, one may deploy absential quantifier (*abhava*) following the relational logic, which also incorporates ontology and phenomenology of empty spaces, of *Nyaya-Vaisesika* (henceforth NV) tradition of Indian Philosophy. Let me elaborate the second one for this purpose of rejuvenating empty elements and to strengthen the semantax of ECP and deletion. In this NV tradition, categories (*padartha*) are distinguished on the basis of their presence (*bhava*) and absence (*abhava*). The NV-tradition considered both the existence and non-existence as categories, which are subject to the knowledge or cognition by means of generic perception. Generally, in the English translations of the NV-literature, this category comes under the notion of negation and its subdivisions are translated as "relational absence" and "mutual absence" or "difference". In the context of empty elements, one may concentrate on the "relational absence" or simply absence rather than that of difference. All relations are regarded here as dyadic relations between two terms: *anuyogin* (referend, qualificand, locus X) and *pratiyogin* (counterpositive, referent, qualifier, located Y). Relation (R) is always a property resident in the residence or referend. Therefore, one can say X –(R-Y) where X is the locus of absence of Y where R is a relata. Thus absence is always designated in relation to something. In case of relational absence, a qualifier qualifies a qualificand and by negating it we get an "absence of that qualifier" (which is another qualifier) qualifying the same qualificand, "this silent-space X is qualified by the speaking-absence Y". On the other hand, difference refers to "this is not silence" type of negation. Absence of non-speaking in an enunciation and difference from a silence or something in another locus are two distinguishable sub-categories of absetial quantifier or *abhava*. One could perceive absence by assigning the absential qualifier/ counterpositive to the (sentential) locus of empty referend or qualificand. Thus, the absence of speaking means perceiving the dyadic relations between two constructs: speaking and non-speaking in a certain locus.

The absential quantifier has solved a crucial problem of deletion that might erase category and content or only the contents of a category by positing the category in a sentential locus of the counterpositive. However, there must be a distinction between a moved element and a deleted element. In case of moved element, the resident of t or R-expression is an instance of posterior absence or *uttara-abhava*, the subdivision, which was not introduced by the old or new school of *Nyaya* and in case of deletion; I wish to maintain the notion of absence of destruction.

In the Western system of logic, the absential qualifier is not used. If ECP needs to be elaborated as a "shallow structure" or something more in connection with the S-structure and LF-interface (within EST or GB), it is necessary to deploy absential quantifier in the sentential calculus to recover the empty elements as cognized by the speaking/hearing subject. And that is a better tool—though yet to be proved by practitioners of syntax.

On the other hand, as the authors were only concerned with the "well-formed/structured" (Do we speak in such a manner? Examples cited by Chomsky excluded the slip of the tongue, gaps, ellipses and unintended sounds) syntagms (that is an usual practice within Chomskian school), they ignored the paradigmatic recurrences as it is occurred in the discursive formation of speaking/hearing subjects engaged in conversation, where not only factual empty elements are operating, but also the non-discursive sonority or unintended sounds (something might be considered as "outside" of language within the Chomskian framework) play a crucial role. In that case one must look into the "outside" of language, which is also a part of language as that so-called outside controls (e.g., what is to said and what is not to be said…) the language itself, even the internalized language, and may put a formal device, say psi- (psycho-social)-properties that may bridge the gap between language, abstracted as well as extracted from social reality and the internalization of the "outside" (Bandyopadhyay, 1996, 2003, e.g., Lowenstamm's paper on gender did not consider such "outside"). In that case socially constrained silencemes (both unspoken and unspeakable phenomena, which are, again, analogous to famous "unknown and unknowable") and their impact on the "psyche" in certain spatio-temporal context may be revealed.

This external critique, which, frankly speaking, is not at all faithful to the methods as followed in the book (authors and readers may pardon me for enlarging the domain of *sounds of silence* as I am recovering the empty [theoretical] elements of the book), may show the way for better explanatory adequacy for understanding silencemes and I am thankful to the assiduous editors

7

and authors, who dared to compose such a book at the moment of deceased ECP, of this book for making scope for writing "other"–sides of empty elements.

I am concluding this review with a charming and marvelous co-incidence: minimalist painting develops colors of silencemes and minimalist program, despite the namesake, keeps silencemes as a pending issue… ECP is dead, long live reincarnated ECP. Resurrection should always be celebrated and not to be sale-brated.

COLOPHON: I am indebted to Prof. B. N. Patnaik for his kind suggestions on the issue of incommensurability of different Chomskian models and Prof. Ramakant Agnihotri, Prof. Probal Dasgupta for helping me to take post-formalist turn. However, usual disclaimers apply. I am also indebted to the LinguistList, Eastern Michigan University for providing me with this unreadable book and for rejecting the review.

ENDNOTE

1. Here are some examples of such pronouncements from good text-book writers:

"In fact, it is perfectly possible to accept part or whole of Chomsky's Linguistics, without accepting his Philosophy of Mind (i.e. innateness hypothesis). In spite of Chomsky's own pronouncement to the contrary, the two are separable, and raise distinct issues." (Radford, 1986: 28)
"[t]hey (innateness hypothesis and Philosophy of Mind) are not wholly relevant to linguistic theory and practice. It is perfectly possible to be a follower of TG and still reject mentalism, innateness or universals, or alternatively, to be a structuralist and accept them. (Palmer, 1983: 194).
Please note that Philosophers are now endangered species.

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N.B.: Chomsky's works (as cited by the authors of the book under review) mentioned above are not cited here in the bibliography to save space and to avoid repetition except only one, which the present reviewer has quoted at the beginning of the review. And it is redundant to say that all these citations from Chomsky can easily be available in the net.